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Answer both questions. (scroll all the way down) Notes: Each answer must present


Answer both questions. (scroll all the way down) Notes: Each answer must present a concise thesis statement in the first couple of lines. Stick to the designated thinkers and assigned readings. (If you’d like to use different editions from the ones assigned in class, make sure these are from a credible academic press.) You must only compare two thinkers per question. Avoid mere summary of the texts. Avoid all unnecessary, superfluous, and peripheral details. You must identify the most pertinent concepts and passages for your question. While you are required to cite throughout your work, namely all the ideas borrowed from the texts, please be reasonable with the amount of quotations. Avoid large quotation blocs. Your reader needs to see you’ve understood the critical concepts in the works you’ve cited. Remember, cite as much as you can, but avoid needless bloc quotations, as you don’t have much space. You may use simple parenthetical citations. But make sure to include page #s. Failure to cite page #s will result in a penalty (-5%). Failure to cite properly could amount to plagiarism. Each answer must be 1200-1400 words. Reading List 1.Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Chapter 8 2.Andrew March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship, Introduction, Chapters 6-7 3.L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism, Chapters 1-2, 7 4.Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Chapter 7, Section I Info Sheet Andrew March in Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus1.Resources for a liberal tradition of Islamic political thoughtIn earlier chapters, March discusses Islamic political ideations which clearly contravene the viewof civil loyalty to a non-Muslim state. These different views deny that Muslim residents of anon-Muslim state can even form “minimal bonds” with their state. March argues “that an Islamicdoctrine of citizenship would require some reformulation of contrary principles (p. 182).”2.Civil loyaltya.Basic principlesIt is important to mention that March is working within the framework of political liberalism.“Political liberalism does not demand that a deep, robust, governance be part of one’scomprehensive conception of the good (p. 182).” In what follows, March explores Islamicresources which promote the view of civil obedience. In particular, he looks at Islamic sources(both contemporary and classical) which effectively argue for a Muslim individual’s loyalty tothe non-Muslim state. b.Contractual ties and civic loyaltyMuslim theorists who support the position of civic loyalty have found lots of substance inIslamic ideations concerning the importance of contracts and abiding by contractual duties.Typically, most of these sources deal with interpersonal contracts – those between contractingindividuals – but moral duties can be extrapolated for larger political discussions, namely theidea that the contract is binding, irrespective of who the contracting parties are. “In what follows, [March] examines[s] further this idea of contract in classical and contemporaryjuridical works. The question to be addressed here is to what extent the duty to uphold contractscan ground compatible responses to the specific demands of civic loyalty (p. 184).”“Jurists from across the Sunni schools are quite clear that contracts made with non-Muslims areas morally binding as those made with Muslims. Muslim behavior in a non-Muslim state isgenerally treated in relation to the legal concept of aman, the formal guarantee of security from apotentially hostile entity that is a form of contract imposing obligations on both sides. Jurists areunanimous in holding that the enjoyment of aman imposes on the Muslim certain moral andsometimes legal obligations to the non-Muslim entity in question (p. 185).” “Once a Muslim has accepted the security of the non-Muslim state, he is bound to follow all ofits laws, including paying taxes that contribute to general social welfare.” c.Limits of contractual theory? Now, this leads to further complications. Is the adherence to contractout of pure good will andconsideration? Simply put, we shouldn’t be terribly focused on the source of political obligation – that is, whatis the motivation for this person’s adherence to the liberal order? Ultimately what matters is thatthe norms of justice are applicable not only to Muslims, but to non-Muslims as well. This, in hisview, fosters a sense of civil obedience that makes it possible for Muslims to remain Muslimwithin a liberal society. “The duty to honor contracts, even tacit ones, is binding on all Muslims,and entering a non-Muslim land is only done under an aman, to do no harm to non-Musliminterests (p. 188).” 3.Private motivations differ from the statea.Nonliberal motivations “Even though the citizen is affirming a civic duty for a different set of reasons than the ones forwhich it is required by the state, as long as these private motivations are not contradictory to, orundermining of, the legitimate rights and interests of the state…, there is no reason not to regardthem as legitimate nonpublic supplementary justifications for the citizen (p. 195).”“For example, there may be public motivations for joining an army derived from individualistconceptions of the good, including the desire to achieve high physical fitness, the desire todevelop or operate cutting-edge technology, the desire to enjoy the solidarity of a cohesiveorganization, the desire to achieve a certain self-image or self-esteem, the desire to acquiremartial skills, the desire to exercise authority over other people, the desire to acquire for freeskills in later application in the labor market, or the desire for a challenging and gratifying career.One can only see how the activities of a military may advance the values of a range ofcomprehensive doctrines (p. 195).”“In all these cases, citizens find that the activities they engage in as citizens are activities theywant to engage in anyway and thus can affirm the demands of a liberal as acceptable from withintheir comprehensive doctrines (p. 195).”b. Religious comprehensive doctrines and unreasonable pluralism“It is precisely the rejection of those metaphysical and epistemological commitments (definitiveof political liberalism) that mark the fact of unreasonable pluralism from the Islamic perspective(p. 211).”How do Muslim jurists committed to liberal norms resolve this dilemma?“However, in a Muslim-minority society, where liberal freedoms already exist and provideadvantages to Muslim communities, the belief that living with nonbelievers is both God’s willand a prerequisite for performing certain cats vital to a virtuous life (calling to Islam, defendingit in a rational manner, advocating justice) is an important pillar of a doctrine of citizenship in such a society (p. 215).” Though this is a good starting block, we need other values andcommitments.4.Justice across communities“That Muslims have reason to believe that sharing social space with non-Muslims is a permanentcondition to be tolerated, or a necessity out of which virtue can be made, implies very little aboutthe nature of relations between communities in that social space. It certainly does not imply thatmembers of different communities have the same moral standing or that they are entitled to thesame standards of treatment (p. 216).” a.Proselytizing as recognitionA brief discussion on toleration and conscience: “there is no necessary intellectual contradictionin believing that faith must be voluntary and sincere while also believing that the state is calledon to advantage a particular doctrine or way of life. There is also no necessary intellectualcontradiction in believing that society is justified in punishing behavior or thought that violatesdivine command (p. 225). art II – Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights1.Kymlicka’s liberal position“Liberals can and should endorse certain group-differentiated rights for ethnic groups andnational minorities. But this endorsement is always a conditional and qualified one. The demandsof some groups exceed what liberalism can accept (p. 152).” A word or two about his theory of Multicultural Citizenship.a.External protections versus internal restrictionsExternal protects “reduce a minority’s vulnerability to the decisions of the larger society (p.152).” Aninternal restriction “the demand by a minority culture to restrict the basic civil or politicalliberties of its own members (p. 152).” b.Illiberal culturesKymlicka states that there are some cultures that are clearly opposed to liberal values. They don’twant to be part of the liberal order, as they want to organize along “traditional, non-liberal lines.Is this not part of what makes them culturally distinct (p. 153)?” “Others would view my theory as illiberal, precisely because its unrelenting commitment toindividual autonomy is intolerant of non-liberal groups (p. 154).” c.On the Ottoman Millet systemThis case is typically lauded by liberal theorists for offering an example of liberal toleration. “But it was not a liberal society, for it did not recognize any principle of individual freedom ofconscience…The millet system was, in effect, a federation of theocracies. It was a deeplyconservative and patriarchal society, antithetical to the ideas of personal liberty endorsed byliberals from Locke to Kant and Mill (p. 157) Part III – Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974)1.Defense of the minimal state“Any state more extensive [than the minimal one] violates people’s rights. Yet many personshave put forth reasons purporting to justify a more extensive state (p. 149).”He strongly opposed to distributive justice, the view that “some thing or mechanism uses someprinciple or criterion to give out a supply of things (ibid).” “In a free society, diverse persons control different resources, and new holdings arise out of thevoluntary exchanges and actions of persons. There is no more a distributing or distribution ofshares than there is a distributing of mates in a society in which persons choose whom they shallmarry (p. 149-150).”2.Against distributive justice a.Holdings and historical principles of justiceWhen Nozick says justice in the acquisition or granting of holdings (or possessions) is historical,this implies that “it depends upon what actually has happened (p. 152).” Was the holdingunjustly acquired by way of coercion, manipulation, or fraud? Or was it voluntary exchanged orhanded over as a gift? In this equation of justice, it is only individuals (as agential beings) whoare the measure of whether an exchange is just. In contrast, you have what Nozick terms “end-result principles”. These are not concerned withhow acquisition occurred but rather an end goal of justice to be attained.In Nozick’s view, historical circumstances are the only factors we may rightly consider for an“entitlement” theory. “The entitlement principles of justice in holdings that we have sketched arehistorical principles of justice (p. 155).”b.Patterning v. non-patterningThere is also another noteworthy distinction in Nozick’s work: patterned v. non-patterned. “Letus call a principle of distribution patterned if it specifies that a distribution is to vary along withsome natural dimension (p. 156).”“Almost every suggested principle of distributive justice is patterned: to each according to hisown moral merit, or needs, or marginal product, or how hard he tries, or the weighted sum of theforegoing, and so on. The principle of entitlement we have sketched is not patterned (p. 156-157).”c.Wilt Chamberlain example“The general point illustrated by the Wilt Chamberlain example…is that no end-state principle ordistributional patterned justice principle of justice can be continuously realized withoutcontinuous interference with people’s lives…To maintain a pattern one must either continually interfere to stop people from transferring resources as they wish to, or continually (orperiodically) interfere to take from some persons resources that others for some reason chose totransfer to them (p. 163).”3.Taxation as forced laborNozick forcefully remarks that “taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor (p.169).” All “patterned principles of distributive justice [including through taxation] involve theappropriating the actions of other persons…If a people force you to do certain work, orunrewarded work, for a certain period of time, they decide what you are to do and what purposesyour work is to serve apart from your decisions. This process whereby they take this decisionfrom you makes them a part-owner of you; it gives them a property right in you (p. 172).”a.How Lockean is Nozick? .The historic beginning of liberalism“Feudal disobedience and disorder were suppressed, and by the end of the fifteenth century greatunified states, the foundation of modern nations, were already in being (p. 17).”Liberalism as a negative critique. “The modern State accordingly starts from the basis of anauthoritarian order, and the protest against that order, a protest religious, political, economic,social, and ethical, is the historic beginning of Liberalism. Thus liberalism appears at first as acriticism, sometimes even as a destructive and revolutionary criticism. Its negative aspect is forcenturies foremost. Its business seems to be not so much to build up as to pull down, to removeobstacles which block human progress, rather than to point the positive goal of endeavour orfashion the fabric of civilization (p. 19).”2.The elements of liberalisma.Civil liberty “Both logically and historically the first point of attack is arbitrary government, and the firstliberty to be secured is the right to be dealt with in accordance with law (p. 21).” Arbitrary power means there is no law – or that the law is applied provisionally or in adiscriminatory fashion. Hobhouse describes “extrajudicial arrest, detention, and punishment” asclassic acts of arbitrary power. In England, these extrajudicial were often restrained throughpositive legal means, such as Habeas Corpus Act or the Petition of Right. He quotes Locke: ““Freedom of men under government,” says Locke…“is to have a standingrule to live by, common to every one of that society and made by the legislative power erected init (p. 23).”i.Universal restraintFor the law to be unconditional, it must be applied to all persons equally. So, not only must it befixed, but it must also be applied to all equally. This is the principle of “universal restraint”. ii.Law and liberty are complementary “The first condition of free government is government not by the arbitrary determination of theruler, but by fixed rules of law, to which the ruler himself is subject…law is essential to liberty(p. 24).”b.Personal liberty, social liberty, and economic liberty“As time has gone on, men of the keenest Liberal sympathies have come n